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ABSTRACT
As a contribution to the current debate on the state-of-the art of regional science, this paper
presents some reflections on the epistemological and methodological status of the discipline as we
approach the turn of the century.
First of all, we present the three bases for this reflection: our philosophical position (with
reference to different schools of thought), our view about relationship between society and science,
our opinion about the guideline of modern science (the science of complexity).
On the basis of these assumptions we approach the following six questions:
·  two related to epistemology: the scientific/artistic nature of regional science and the suitability
of use of mathematical language;
·  two related to theory and method in Regional Science: the problem of rationality in planning and
the increasing importance of creativity in (regional science);
·  two concerning the planning praxis: the problem of balance between innovation and ecology and
the meaning of strategic planning.
Paper presented at the  38
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While, in the recent debate on the "crisis" of Regional Science, there are numerous papers on the
relevance of this doctrine, there are far fewer on the systematic setting, namely the  scientific
foundation of urban and regional analysis and planning. The reason is the antiscientific attitude
among regional scientist, which is fastly widespreading, despite the fact that this can undermine the
effectiveness of analysis and planning. In the present paper we wish to examine the scientific
foundation of the discipline, with the aim of presenting the most recent developments of this
approach.
We intend to state  this  emerging  system  of  ideas  (in our  own re-elaboration) as a set of theses.
These,  which  cover the classical themes of  the  current  debate  on  regional science, deliberately
exclude  some  important  dimensions such as aesthetics and, above all, ethics. This is partly for
reasons of  space and our own incomplete development of these themes, but mainly because of the
lack of non-resolution of these aspects of  the  cultural  paradigm,  (useful elements are provided for
interpretation, but not prescriptive guidelines (Crook, 1994)).
Foundations of this paradigm or, to be more precise, postulates of our weltanschauung, are:
- in relation to the nature of knowledge, a position definable as  critical genetic realism
(Piaget, 1970, Popper, 1981);
- in relation to the theoretical and methodological basis of the  sciences (including territorial
sciences) a synergetic-evolutionary type axiom (Delbruck, 1986, Haken, 1977, Prigogine, 1980);
- in relation to the  specific  character  of  the  current  socio-economic scenario (subject and
container of urban planning) an interpretation in terms of the cosmo-creative society  (McLuhan,
1970, Laszlo, 1972, Andersson et al., 1993).
Even though necessarily in a synthetic and incomplete way, it could be useful to make some
elements of these assumptions more explicit.
As regards the first (the epistemological framework), it seems to us that a good starting-point is the
mind-brain problem. Almost all neurobiologists nowaday think (and we share their opinion) that the
mind (and probably the consciousness) are the expression of the activity of a very large number of
neurons (the brain). This biological naturalism (Searle, 1992) means that mental phenomena must
not be dealt with  as  something  metaphysical, but at the same time it does not mean that they are
nothing but mechanisms, in a simple and mechanical sense. Therefore any counterposition between
culture  and  nature is artificial, they are two systems  which  evolve  and coevolve. In  this context,
although the truth of an argument does  not necessarily consist of what human evidence and humanmeans  of investigation can show, the conclusions reached in this way are not necessarily the
determining factors of this truth. So there is a space between the utopia of classical absolute
rationality and the irrational nihilism of hermeneutically  closed linguistic  systems,  for the
development of a Popperian style of knowledge which is objective but not dogmatic (true but not
certain) and always self-critical in a evolutionary way.  And this applies, according to Piaget, to the
highest levels of knowledge, where epistemologies and scientific theories coevolve with retroactive
feedback.
Finally, we should mention the problem of scientific progress (that is to say the definition of the
best or fittest theories  and  epistemologies in the evolutive  comparison).  Personally,  we  think
that the question, which has still not been resolved in the debate among post-Popperian
epistemologists (Laudan, 1977), has to be  considered within the paradigm of critical realism. This
point of view provides a solution to the problem.
As regards the second assumption (the theoric framework), the natural starting-point is the deep
change which is taking place in the scientific theories. Most people perceive this radical enough to
suppose a complete break with classical science and the birth  of a new  paradigm (the complexity
paradigm) focussing on self-referencial, hologrammatic principles Morin,1990). Even though it is
disputable whether it is a true paradigmatic breaking-point, this view is  particularly effective in
explaining why in the past:
- large interactive systems were analysed in the same way as small ordered systems, mainly
because  the method formulated had proved itself very effective for simple systems;
- we were convinced that the behaviour of large interactive systems could be anticipated by
studying its constituent elements and analysing the microscopic mechanisms individually;
- in default of a better theory, we supposed that the output  of the large interactive systems was
proportional to the perturbations, hence the dynamics of these systems could be described in an
equilibrium state, disturbed from time to time by an exogenous force.
Over the past decade it has become more and more evident that:
- in large interactive systems, global  properties can emerge (so-called because they appear only
from the whole system), requiring non traditional methods of analysis;
- the unexpected appearance of these properties derives from the interactions between local
subsystem behaviour and the global behaviour (the so-called micro/macro relations);
- this usually involves conditions of irreversibility and disequilibrium. Large  interactive
systems never reach an equilibrium state, they evolve from one metastable state to another.In this synergetic (and also intrinsically evolutionary) approach to systems, we should perhaps
specify that Darwinist principles still have a place - no longer however as a mere biological
metaphor, but in the form of the so-called neo-neo-Darwinist systems theories (see for instance
Casti, 1989). Rather at random, and left to  the  intuitive  understanding,  we  mention  some  key
concepts relating to these theories:
- the concept of window (limited horizon) of observability of the system through the subsystems
(with  the  consequent focus on heuristics, robustness, satisfaction etc.);
  - the  mechanism of trial and error and differential selection in the evolution of the system (with
the consequent importance of coevolution between system and subsystems, the uniqueness
and similarity of the subsystems, their phenotype and genotype);
- the blind and imperfect character of evolution (with its serendipity, creative but without any
finalism).
We should also specify that today’s evolutionism, far from being a monolithic and complete
construction, is a  living  science,  with objections, unsolved problems  and  lively  diatribes  over
basic matters.  But everybody now admits that these  are  internal affairs   and that the  essential
truth  of  evolutionism  is  never in doubt (Gould, 1987).
As regards the third and last assumption (the context  of urban planning, i.e. the character of our
civilization), we need to consider aspects such as high technology, the media as well as the  various
social phenomena associated with them. To describe the importance of innovation and the diffusion
of its effects, the expression, we often hear the expressions the information society, technopolis etc.
Many of these linguistic symbols however do not seem to go beyond a mechanistic vision of
society. To be consistent with the two previous assumptions, we prefer to speak of the cosmo-
creative society, since this catches a salient feature of the present civilisation, the explosive  spread
of creativity in all its manifestations throughout our culture (especially, but not only, the scientific
world). The trigger of this process is  coevolution, the positive self-accelerating feed-backs between
culture, science and  technology (see for instance Cini, 1990).
Firstly, in the relationship  between technology  and science, there has been an enormous increase in
the  speed of transfer of scientific advance to technological products and growing scientific added
value in  these same products. Technology, on the other hand, has been able  to provide scientific
research with investigation and measurement instruments of greatly enhanced performance. There is
a decreasing distinction between science and technology. It is increasingly difficult to differentiate
complex technology projects from pure scientific research. Technological progress has also opened
immense potential and influenced the style of research due, for  instance, to the possibility ofcomputerized data processing. Armed with this  accumulation  of science and technology our
society, already deeply changed but still rapidly evolving, is facing:
- transformation in its own demographic structure;
- redefinition of the basis of organization;
- and, above all, growth in its culture.
So ours is a more deeply and more widely educated  society (and for this reason more complex and
varied), which wants to be creative per se and expresses this creativity through science, technology
and art. We should note that, being an educated society, it accompanies this  with self-critical
reflection. It remains to say that the city, as the place where the above system  of interactions are
manifest (Mela,  1985) is the natural seat of modern civilization (the  common   etymology: city
<=>   civitas   <=> civilization is more valid than ever). And as the scale  of  civilization is now
planetary,  the city is everywhere!
It is on the basis of these assumptions that we approach the following six questions, two related to
epistemology, two related to theory and method in Regional Science, and two concerning the
associated planning praxis. The paper concludes with a final observation, which derives logically
from the reasoning presented.
2. Regional (Science): Art, Science or Profession?
Sciences are usually cited in terms of concepts (fractals, neural nets  etc.), with which the name of
some scientist is connected, while in the arts we tend to cite personalities (Hopper, Warhol etc. and
similarly Christaller,  Losch, Weber ...) with whom a cultural  movement or cultural position is
associated. It is a small sign that reveals, despite the widely held opposite view, how  rooted is an
artistic  conception  in  regional science (in french and italian schools, particularly). So a reflection
on the  nature  (artistic  or  scientific)  of  the discipline is not obsolete.
Some results (now  unanimously  accepted) of cognitive psychology concerning types of knowledge
(see  for  instance  Bara, 1990) help to clarify the issue. Summarizing, we can say that:
- a map of the types of knowledge and their interactions is as follows:
         K - TACIT   _______________________   K - ESPLICIT   Analogical and procedural                       Declaratory and linguistic
     (Images, productions)                            (Frames, semantic nets)
½___________  K - MODEL_________½
                                              (Mental models)
- the first type is so-called explicit knowledge (K-explicit). This corresponds to the intuitive
concept of knowledge, it is what we know we know, i.e. an aware knowledge, about which we
can voluntarily reflect and that can be linguistically expressed. The characteristic representation
of this type of knowledge is that of logic formalism, in particular classic logic; but when the
limits of this emerged other systems of logic have been proposed - default logic, self-deductive
logic etc. - or other approaches, such as semantic nets or frames);
- the second type is tacit knowledge. It corresponds to knowing how to interact effectively with
the world, even if we are not able to make such knowledge explicit(i.e. describe it directly and
reflect on it). Examples are: being able to ride a bicycle, to recognize a wine, to be at one’s ease,
be able to sing, paint, write poetry etc.; all things that the expert can do well, but can only
express  verbally approximately, with analogies and metaphors. This type of knowledge is
represented through the so-called rules of production, procedural codes which allow us to know
how to act;
- the third type of knowledge, model  knowledge, is a specific
model which integrates the two previous types of knowledge. It is a set of partial configurations
of the theoretical knowledge imbedded in  K-tacit and K-explicit knowledge; it is the aspect of
knowledge which the thinking person is effectively using in a specific moment. The analogical
representation of this form of knowledge is the  mental model (Johnson-Laird, 1983). This is
made up of elements  and  relations which represent a particular condition of things, already
structured in a appropriate way for use).
It should add that the relationship between K-tacit and K-explicit knowledge is complex and
elusive, corresponding roughly to the connection between the that which is experienced and that
symbolized.
From tacit knowledge we can try to build a propositional theory and from explicit knowledge to
organize procedural codes. However, while  K-explicit is by its nature trasmissible or teachable (and
therefore socializable), K-tacit knowledge is personal, and learnable only by doing.
On this basis, we think we can formulate the following thesis:- in analysis and planning (in regional science, as in human actions in general) art and science
cannot be put in antithetic terms. In every action or professional activity (to include science and
art), to proceed by means of mental models inevitably involves merging the two types of
knowledge: tacit (which is the essential, but not exclusive, base of artistic creation) and explicit
(which specific,  but  not  exclusive, to scientific research);
- society, in its growing cosmo-creativity and consequently growing  and increasingly aware
participation in planning processes (both as informed subject and direct actor), necessarily
requires explicit (transmitable) knowledge in order to be able to participate. So the development
of scientific skills in urban studies,  and achieving a higher K-explicit content is  necessary for its
own raison   d’ˆtre (and survival as a recognizable academic discipline).
3. Technical Languages in Regional Studies
Strong languages (that is to say propositional theories and K-explicit knowledge) do not seem to be
particularly appreciated in current regional science.
Let us consider the criticisms of the mathematical approach (i.e. the systemic and  formalized
method) as the case par excellence of K-explicit knowledge, not forgetting the general validity of
the considerations that follow.
While the radical ideologic objections of the seventies have now been exhausted (note: the history
of evolutionist thought and of historical materialism is full of consonances and misunderstandings;
see Rosser, 1991) and many of the objections formulated on a hermeneutic basis in the eighties
having failed (see Vozza, 1990) with the diffusion of the critical rationalism, the most virulent
attack on the mathematical method has come from post-structuralist deconstructionism  (Derrida,
1967). The accusation is that its application in this field does not correspond intrinsically to the
principles usually given as justification for its use (or its preference in relation to other languages):
its universality (i.e. its validity at any time and in any place); the logical rigour (which make it
possible to deduce   consistent theories); its objectiveness (which excludes individual and collective
cultural bias); the simplification (to read the complexity of the world) and the exactness (which
eliminates ambiguities). To be precise, we have to say that the criticism is directed towards a
classical rationalist conception of the method; but it is also a useful exercise for critical rationalism.
As Barnes (1994)argues, from a deconstructionist point of view, the mathematical method does not
keep any of its promises because of contradictions from which he claims there is no escape:
- universality is always founded on local assertions;
- logic is unable by itself to justify the use of logic;- the argument of objectiveness is in itself a judgement of value;
- simplification is obtained only through complexity;
- precision is expressible only through the inaccuracy of ordinary language.
These contradictions are proved in the following way:
- it is shown (by means, for instance, of the Russell’s logical paradox and G”del's theorem of
formal incompleteness) that attempts to found mathematics all fail to build a closed self-
explanatory system;
- there is therefore always a residual meaning rooted in local institutional practices that arose
historically, that is in the social dimension of knowledge (Bloor, 1976);
-  this determines the inaccuracies, arbitrairness, contingencies etc. that are the basis of the above
contradictions.
This reasoning, in the epistemology which we accept, seems to be biased by an inconsistency:
- we implicitly assume that the analyst, in order to be able to declare failure in the test of self-
explanatory nature of mathematics, must have a strong rationality;
- but the analyst cannot at the same time be free of the declared great cognitive fallacy (of
knowledge as a social activity), so ...
On the other hand, if:
- without the axiom of strong rationality, the analysis confines itself to the proposition of
mathematical language as an open programme (see, for  instance  the  developments  on
Russell's paradox) inspired by principles of logic, precision etc. which are understood in a
relativistic way;
- and knowledge, without denying its contextualization in society, appears  with  naturalistic
objectivistic conditionings (reinforced by the same use of strong languages);
instead of an antinomy, we have a virtuous (evolutive) circle that qualifies mathematical language in
comparison with other languages.
The  conclusion is a solicitation to regional  scientist "to cultivate the necessary, cumulative and
provisional certainties of technical languages" (Mazza, 1994, p.158). I personally would put no
exceptions on this invitation and give an emphasis, among strong languages, on the systemic
formalized one.
4. The Myth Of IrrationalityFollowing up on Mela and Preto (1990) and Camagni (1988), a useful diagram relating concepts of
planning (understood in the broad sense of the capacity to govern the territory through appropriate
actions) is given by:
                                 Systemic
                                 realism
                                    ½
               ¨Liberalist tech-    ½         ¨Rational-compre-
                nological plan      ½          hensive plan
                                    ½
                                    ½
   Omnipotent                     ½                     Absolute
market _____________________½__________________  dirigisme
                                    ½
   ½   ¨Agreement
                                    ½         ¨Negotiation
                ¨ No plan           ½
                                    ½
                               Individualistic
   nominalism
The two variables that define the space of this chart pertain to the forming dimension and the
cognitive dimension of the plan. The first considers the degree of coordination among the system of
actors. At one extreme there is total reciprocal autonomy, where the government  of the territory is
left completely to the operational mechanisms of the system (i.e. the market has free play). At the
opposite extreme there is complete coordination among the actors (by agreement or by hierarchical
structure) who can, together, totally guide the system (absolute  dirigisme). Naturally, the degree of
coordination between decision-makers can vary and be differentiated according to how it is
achieved. Therefore, in reality, there is a wide range of intermediate  possibilities.
The second variable concerns how the planned system can be known, in other words, the degree to
which it can be interpreted. At one extreme, we have a system made up of physical, economic and
social entities with an objective reality for which we have strong explanatory theories describing
their essence and interrelations (classic systemic realism). At the opposite extreme we have the
weak concept of thought which considers the objects of the plan in terms of nominal categories of
complex realities which elude definition and, at best, can be referred to by metaphor and analogy(this we refer to as individualistic nominalism). In this case too, there are numerous intermediate
positions, which reflect the view of reality and the role and characteristics of the observer in the
analysis.
As can be observed in the chart, by combining these two variables we can represent the main
positions taken in the debate on planning: the denial of the possibility of planning, the rational-
comprehensive plan, planning by agreement, the negotiated plan etc. This is why the chart  is
undoubtedly a useful tool for describing the evolution of urban planning. We are, however,
perplexed when this evolution is explained in terms of a causal nexus between the two variables
(the evolution of the knowledge-action nexus examined by  Friedman, 1993 among others), i.e. the
hypothesis of a simple and direct connection between rational systemic knowledge and strong
action, moving towards more complex and weaker forms of  action corresponding to weaker
thought.
Only a visual illusion (or gross simplification) can reduce the vast constellation of theories
regarding the capacity to know, or the complexity of the system of interactions between actors to a
one-dimensional axis. Quite  independently of any epistemological reflections, the weakening of
planning actions is also the result of the growing education of the population in planning matters.
People are taking on more direct involvement, and making it necessary to redefine (reinvent?) forms
of coordination, also to innovate the role of the planner, who previously has acted as the benevolent
prince’s right arm! (I should like to point out that this is a general phenomenon gaining vast
importance. It is currently affecting the international political order as well as the organization of
Italian politics, for instance. The mechanism outlined, cultural growth leading to role crisis, is
necessary and providing a suitable terrain for the autonomous development of planning practice and
academic reflection with the gradual professionalization of the latter.
It should be added that the illusion referred to above has operated historically in the opposite way.
Faced with the transformation of society and the crisis in planning, there was a tendency to reduce
the causal factor to a single axis (rationality/irrationality) overlooking the variety of epistemological
paradigms and including all questions, ontological, semantic etc., in this simplified dichotomy. In
this regard the debate of the eighties on rationality is significant. As observed by Reade (1985),
planners did not refer to rationality in the limited sense adopted for instance by economists, but they
reasoned on the basis of functional rationality and substantive rationality , touching on but never
delving deeply into the epistemological issues that this raises. For this reason the debate turned out
to be inconclusive and left as an aftermath a vague (yet  painful) sense of the irrationality of
planning, that still pervades all concepts of planning except the traditional one.An alternative to this state of things is to deal more thoroughly with epistemological matters and
theoretical and methodological questions. In fact advances have been made in knowledge about the
nature of  rationality by scholars such as Rapoport, Tversky and Harsanyi in disciplines like
psychological economics and mathematical game theory (see Barry and Harding, 1982).
5. Revealed Creativity
The thesis of this chapter is that creativity (the act, individual or social, displaying varying degrees
of ingenious inventiveness, leading for instance to the urban project or plan), which has long been
the centre of scientific attention, is a phenomena whose mechanisms are now being clarified and
explained scientifically. This does is not imply that we are nearing a mechanical reproduction of the
creative act (even though that may happen in the long run), but that even the most hidden
component of ‘knowing how to do things’ - tacit knowledge - which permits the planner or designer
to considers himself such, is becoming explicit knowledge.
In the past, with respect to creativity, there were two  opposite attitudes (not connected on levels of
erudition or by an opposition of the two cultures, humanities and science) (see Melucci, 1994):
- one, mysterious, which emphasized the uniqueness of the creative genius (Einstein, Leonardo
etc.), the fortuitousness of the event  (Newton's apple, Archimede's eureka etc.) and the connection
with the irrational (the association of genius with disorderliness, the stereotype of the absent-minded
professor, etc.);
- the other, rationalizing, which underlined the normal character of creative activity (the sweat of
research, the mediocrity of much work of famous geniuses), the regularity of the event (the creative
act as  inevitable in given historical, cultural and economic settings, the possibility of ‘learning’
creativity (the lateral thought of Gardner, 1983) and, even it is highly complex and not yet fully
understood, the mechanistic nature of the  phenomenon (creation appears at the end of a process,
almost naturally, as an inevitable consequence of certain passages).
This is the context of the diatribe about the procedure of systemic planning (by McLoughlin and
Chadwick). While this approach is criticized for its supposed clain to absolute control over the
system (an unfounded criticism, given the space left for creativity in defining  alternative policies),
it is defended too weakly as a being a merely informative - analytical and evaluation - phase of the
planning process. In reality, it had begun to address the problem of clarifying  the creative
mechanisms in planning.
The latest evolutionary theories of creativity cast some light on the  problem. In the differential
selection process (mutation of genotypes and environmental selection) these  theories reconciliatethe two aspects of the creative act. It is the serendipity of invention, which derives not only from
problem solving (generally speaking, the phase of selecting the most suitable from among various
alternatives), but also from the factors operating in the problem formulation (the phase of generation
of alternatives through suitable mechanisms). It is in the problem solving process (made into a
social activity through the clarification of the mechanism involved) that systemic planning has a
precise  connection (shown for instance by the particular attention given to the nexus between
simulation models, performance indicators  and evaluation methods, Bertuglia, Clarke and Wilson,
eds., 1994).
Problem formulation is the subject of current studies in the field of creativity. If we reject the idea
that the creative act is only the new combination of old  ideas (that it does not follow simple
mechanisms like random mutation or ideas such as gene-crossings), but involves the expansion of a
field of endeavour through ideas that do not emerge simply by  following the usual rules, it
nonetheless does not suffice to  rashly  break the rules. A careful examination of creative work
reveals the presence of constraints (various kinds of metarule). It is the interaction between the
representations of the problem (i.e. the field of endeavour) and these metarules that generates a
series of possibilities which may eventually produce a radical change, or creative  invention. Artistic
and scientific creativity thus seem to belong to the properties of the large interacting systems cited
in the introduction.
These problem-solving processes are now, in simple versions, captured in software programmes -
computers are at the dawn of creativity (Matthews, 1994).
6. Technological Innovation and Ecological Planning
Among the current topics being debates among planners, two of the most important are the
relationship between territorial systems and technological  innovation, and the ecological orientation
of  planning  (both  underlie  many  other matters being discussed,  from the amendments of
normative land-use laws to the evaluation of large infrastructural projects, renewal and
rehabilitation policies, and so on).
Regarding the  former,  among a large number of studies and projects, the Megaride Charter 94
(Beguinot, 1994) stand out.  This contains, very  briefly,  the following proposal:
- to invert the  logic  of  the  relationship  between  technological innovation and territorial
transformation ( from innovation  as an  exogenous  and  uncontrolled  factor  of  transformation
to innovation that is functional to transformation);
- to build a liveable city (a beautiful city, of  peace and of science) specifically means of innovation.Regarding the theme of ecologically-oriented  planning, almost the entire urban planning
community has made an effort, though some more specifically (see, for instance, in Italy,
Magnaghi,  1990) coming up with a proposal that can be outlined as follows:
- to pursue  sustainable development  as an alternative to destruction, sacking and impoverishment
of the territory caused by the search for unlimited economic growth (IUCN, 1980);
- and,  to this purpose,  to aim for a form of  local  development which takes into account all
specific and unrepeatable features of a place and therefore values all differences.
The two proposals seem similar in many  ways; they are certainly not conflicting. Both emerge from
the  complexity paradigm  (in contrast with the classic  paradigm) cited in the introduction.
Nonetheless, between the two schools of thought there is an evident contrast. The thesis put forth
here is that the conflict arises from the lack of  examination of complex thought in both proposals.
They attribute, more or less explicitly, a positive or negative moral value to technological
innovation. This moral value derives from criteria of judgement of a society that still thinks to a
large  degree  according  to  the  canons  of  classical rationality. To be precise, it is acknowledged
that the scholars involved in the Megaride Charter 94  have sought motivations for their proposal in
the science of complexity (see for instance Rabino, 1993) but:
- the arguments on complexity often lend themselves to ambiguous interpretations; that is, they
tend to be interpreted according to classical rationality (see the proclaimed principle of simplifying
complexity or the controllist nature of planning that the proposal seems to reveal);
- the science of complexity is used  more as an analytical method for criticizing the present urban
situation than as a planning tool (the  objectives of the proposal emerge in general as an antithesis to
the status quo determined by the usual way of interpreting the situation, rather than a new way of
perceiving problems).
At  this point, it is fair to  say  that  in  the  most  recent studies (for instance, Beguinot, 1995) care
has been taken to avoid the kind of misunderstandings mentioned above. As far as the ecologist
planning  school  is  concerned, it should be said immediately that it is difficult to recognize in the
whole ecology movement any single clear theoretical basis. Completely different cultural positions,
such as bourgeois naturalism, eco-industrial technocratism, total romantic ecologism, neo-
Malthusianism, one-worldism etc. appear to be grouped together. This lack of  foundation  has been
denounced within  the ecology  movement  itself (O’Connor, 1988) as the germ of its own
destruction. As a result of this confusion at the theoretical level, we can ascertain in authors
belonging to this school:- the persistence of a  classic mentality  (for instance, the enunciation of the principle of
sustainable  development in terms of functional extremals - minimizing, constraining etc., which is
typical of the absolute rationality);
- the logical  shortcuts,  free  inductions, metaphorical jumps etc. in deriving indications for
planning from the principles of complexity, often containing errors, such as the counterposition
between  local  and  global (which in complex thought are in fact  always connected through the
hologramatic principle).
It is therefore no wonder that misunderstandings occur between the two schools.
7. Strategic Planning and Evolutionism
Another theme of the current urban planning debate  is  strategic planning. Derived from economics
and management, like many other topics (from  urban  marketing  to  networking, the problem of
sustainability itself and  technological innovation), strategic  planning  is characterized  by  the
following elements (Gibelli, 1993):
- it gives priority to perspective and scenario analysis;
- it is dynamic and flexible with respect to the selection of objectives and implemental choices;
- it  identifies  opportunities  and  challenges  in  the  outside environment, and the strong and
weak points inside;
- it operates in an openly pragmatic dimension;
- it proposes systemic analysis, uses learning processes and repetitive revisions and prefers
negotiating interaction  rather than conflicting opposition;
- it promotes consultation and extended participation;
- it attributes strategic importance  to the implementation phases of the plan;
- its predominant role is one of persuasion and marketing.
To emphasize the complex and organic view that underlies these features of strategic planning
would be superfluous: from the irreversible dynamics of the environment, to the limited rationality
of the actor, and his flexible and  satisficing behaviour. What we wish to emphasize is that these
characteristics, going beyond pure contextualization and mere biological metaphor, introduce into
planning an environment, actors and mechanisms typical of evolutionary complexity; for instance:
- the co-evolution between the environment and the planning process  (the role of persuasion,
consultation and participation, the importance of the implementation phase etc.);- the internal structure (genotype) of the actors that changes in  relation  to  the  interaction
between  its behaviour (phenotype)  and the  environment  (identifying the strong and    weak
points, prefering negotiating interaction etc.);
- the  centrality  of  trial  and  error in the mechanisms (learning   and   revision   processes ,
scenario    analysis, operative dimension openly pragmatic etc.).
What has been said should not be surprising since evolutionism seems to be the theoretical
reference which dominates modern economics (Nelson and  Winter,  1982) and management
(Hannan and Freeman, 1989). The message of this chapter for strategic planning, and urban
planning in general, is to root its investigations directly in such theoretical  foundations instead of
adopting them from other disciplines. In this way, we feel, the analysis could be more correct and
productive; certainly more original.
An addendum is appropriate here. The above might seem to imply that evolutionism is in
opposition to mechanicism (and that we have  abandoned the latter for the former). In fact,
evolutionary theory is a more general theory that includes mechanicism as a special case. In such
relationships, the principles which define the conditions under  which  the  general  rule
degenerates to the particular case are particularly important (e.g. Bohr’s theorem for  quantistic  and
classic systems  and the  K.A.M. theorem for chaotic and regular systems). Between evolutionism
and mechanicism the correspondence  principle is  the  theorem  of  evolutionarily  stable
strategies which, generally speaking, states that: in a constant environment   certain behaviour
strategies are better than all the others and cannot be improved (Maynard Smith, 1982). These
behaviours, seen from the outside, may seem like mechanical relationships between the factors by
which they are determined. On the other hand, real systems, though evolutive, must be fairly
constant (otherwise we would not be able to talk about them). Mechanicism is therefore certainly an
approximation, but it often remains the best available cognitive hypothesis.
8. Conclusions
Throughout this entire paper we have argued in favour of scientific - but not scientistic - regional
science (both analysis and planning): a scientific approach, renewed as a consequence of the
(justified) criticism raised by the so-called  weak school of thought, but not succumbing to the anti-
scientific  vein of much post-modern thought.
Space does not allow, and it was not in any case the intention of this paper to make a detailed
presentation of the operational principles  of the proposed style of planning (even though somegeneral principles have been proposed in sections 6 and 7), but the interested reader can find an
initial attempt in Rabino, 1996, concerning the planning of the transportation subsystem and a post-
modern transport model. Although only a tentative approach, the soundness, validity and promise of
this direction of work seem to be widely shared and not only the subjective opinion of these writers.
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